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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 990925-CA 
v. : 
KURT JOSEPH SCHMITT, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals his convictions for unlawful possession of 
laboratory equipment or supplies with the intent to engage in a 
clandestine operation, a first degree felony, and for possession 
of methamphetamine,, a second degree felony. Utah Code Ann. §78-
2-2(3)(i) and (4) (1996) and § 78-2a-3(j) (1996) give this Court 
jurisdiction. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Does defendant have a constitutional right to enforce a plea 
offer? 
Defendant's single appellate claim raises an issue of 
constitutional law; therefore, the Court reviews the issue for 
correctness with no deference to the trial court. Cf. Provo 
City Corp. v. Willden, 768 P.2d 455, 456 (Utah 1989) 
(constitutional challenges to statute are questions of law 
reviewed for correctness with no deference to the trial courts' 
rulings). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-8 (Supp. 2000), 58-37d-4 (1998), and 
58-3 7d-5 (Supp. 2000) are attached as addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged defendant with unlawful possession of 
laboratory equipment or supplies in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
58-37d-4 (1996), enhanced to a first degree felony by Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37d-5 (Supp. 2000), and possession of methamphetamine, 
a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 
(Supp. 2000) (R. 2-1). 
A jury convicted defendant of both counts (R. 286-85). The 
trial court sentenced defendant to the statutory prison terms of 
five years to life on the first degree felony and one to fifteen 
years on the second degree felony (R. 311). The Court imposed no 
fines (id.). 
Defendant timely filed his notice of appeal to the Utah 
Supreme Court (R. 308) . The supreme court transferred the case 
to this Court (R. 319). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts underlying the criminal charges have no relevance 
to the single appellate issue. The State summarizes only the 
procedural facts related to petitioner's single constitutional 
2 
claim. 
On August 27, 1999, the Friday before the Monday, August 30, 
1999, trial date, defendant filed a motion to enforce a plea 
agreement and supporting memorandum and affidavits (R. 226-15).l 
On the morning of the August 30 trial, the trial court heard 
argument, direct testimony proffers (which the parties agreed to 
accept in lieu of sworn testimony from defense and State's 
counsel), and sworn cross-examination of State's counsel 
concerning the motion to enforce the plea agreement (R. 292-92; 
321 at 9-24). Pages 9-24 from the trial transcript are attached 
as addendum B. 
Defendant's counsel proffered that, in April 1999, shortly 
after he filed his motion to suppress evidence, the prosecutor 
offered a plea bargain to defendant and co-defendant Robert Shell 
(R. 321 at 9). (Defendant's counsel represented both.) 
According to counsel, defendant did not want to take the plea at 
first (id. at 10). However, after discussions lasting "probably 
upwards of an hour," counsel obtained defendant's agreement to 
accept the prosecutor's offer (id. at 10). 
Counsel proffered that, immediately after he met with 
defendant, he called the prosecutor on his cell phone and told 
rEven though the Court held multiple scheduling conferences 
and hearings in this case prior to trial, the record contains no 
mention of a plea agreement in any proceeding prior to the August 
27, 1999, motion (R. 53, 64, 108, 148-47, 154, 117). 
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the prosecutor that he had been "raked over the coals by [his] 
client but [defendant] has agreed to the settlement offer" (id.). 
Counsel suggested that the prosecutor prepare a written plea 
agreement (id.) . 
According to defense counsel, the matter "more or less got 
dropped" while defendant focused on the suppression motion (id. 
at 10-11). Counsel proffered that, during a June 7, 1999, 
suppression hearing, he attempted to "take care" of Shell's plea, 
but the Court considered the proffered guilty plea premature 
until it ruled on the suppression motion (id. at 11). Counsel 
also proffered that, at the June 7 hearing, he confirmed with the 
prosecutor defendant's desire to accept the plea offer (id.). 
After that hearing, the plea again "got lost in the shuffle" 
(id.) .* 
Counsel proffered that he visited defendant on August 13, 
1999 (id.). At that visit, defendant again confirmed he wanted 
the plea agreement (id.). 
The prosecutor's proffered direct testimony and sworn cross-
examination contradicted defense counsel's version of the 
negotiations. According to the prosecutor, he made an offer in 
2The trial court asked counsel whether he had a transcript 
demonstrating Shell's attempt to plead guilty on June 7, 1999 
(id. at 24). Counsel admitted he did not (id.). The trial court 
reviewed the record before it and noted that it contained no 
minutes from any hearing on June 7, 1999, and that the minutes of 
the May 3, May 5, and June 14 hearings mentioned no attempted 
plea by Shell (id. at 24-25) . 
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March 1999, and defendant rejected it (id. at 17-20) . He denied 
having any telephone discussion in which defense counsel told him 
that defense counsel had a "difficult time" with defendant about 
the offer, but that defendant had ultimately accepted it (id. at 
20). Defense counsel contacted the prosecutor about the offer 
after the trial court denied the suppression motion (id. at 17) . 
The prosecutor responded that there was no offer on the table for 
defendant to accept (id. at 17-18).3 
In addition to his proffer, the prosecutor argued that 
defendant had not filed the motion to enforce timely (R. 17) . 
The trial court did not resolve the factual dispute (R. 26). 
Instead, the court concluded that defendant had not met his 
burden to establish that a plea agreement existed because the 
"evidence was so equally balanced" (id. at 26). 
In addition the trial court found the motion untimely (R. 
25). The court rejected defendant's argument that his motion to 
enforce was tantamount to a motion challenging the court's 
jurisdiction (id. at 25-26). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant has not challenged the trial court's conclusion 
3In support of his proffer, the prosecutor presented plea 
documents dated March 30, 1999 (R. 249-41; R. 321 at 17, 20). He 
testified on cross-examination that he never delivered the 
documents to defense counsel because defendant rejected the offer 
(R. 321 at 20). The prosecutor further proffered that the State 
clearly believed no plea agreement existed because the State had 
prepared for trial (id. at 23-24) .~~ 
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that no plea agreement existed. Defendant contends only that he 
had a constitutional right to enforce the plea offer. 
Controlling precedent dictates the opposite result. 
In addition, the trial court found that defendant untimely 
filed his motion to enforce the alleged plea agreement. 
Defendant identifies no error in that conclusion. The trial 
court's rejection of the motion on timeliness grounds provides an 
additional and independent basis to affirm. 
ARGUMENT 
DEFENDANT HAD NO CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO ENFORCE A PLEA 
AGREEMENT, LET ALONE AN UNACCEPTED PLEA OFFER; 
ALTERNATIVELY, THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO 
GRANT AN UNTIMELY MOTION TO ENFORCE THE ALLEGED 
AGREEMENT 
Defendant does not challenge the trial court's conclusion 
that he did not sustain his burden of proving that a plea 
agreement existed. • Appellant's Brief at 5. Defendant contends 
only that he had a reasonable expectation in the plea offer that 
created a constitutional right to enforce it.4 
4Defendant cites both federal and state constitutional 
provisions. However, he does not argue that the State 
constitution provides him any greater protections in the plea 
negotiation process than the federal. Therefore, defendant 
presents no basis for a separate state constitutional analysis. 
See, e.g., State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 489 (Utah 1988) 
(holding in a capital case that "nominally" referring to state 
constitutional arguments is insufficient to consider them on 
their merits: "•[t]his Court will not engage in constructing 
arguments out of whole cloth on behalf of defendants in capital 
cases1") (citation omitted); State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 
1344 (Utah 1984) (declining to reach the merits of the 
defendant's state constitutional challenge because defendant 
6 
Controlling precedent establishes that defendant had no 
constitutional right to enforce a plea agreement, let alone an 
unaccepted offer. In Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504 (1984), the 
United States Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant has no 
constitutional right to enforce a plea agreement until he has 
actually pleaded guilty. In Mabry, Johnson accepted a plea offer 
extended by a state prosecutor. Id. at 505-506. However, the 
prosecutor responded that he had made a mistake and withdrew the 
offer, proposing instead a less favorable one. Id. at 506. In 
federal habeas litigation, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals 
held that "fairness'' precluded the prosecutor from withdrawing 
the offer once Johnson accepted it. Id. 
The United States Supreme Court reversed. The Supreme Court 
failed to provide any supporting legal analysis or authority). 
Defendant also states in his brief that the State never did 
anything to withdraw the offer, and that "it is undisputed that 
Defendant believed that the offer continued to remain open at all 
times." Appellant's Brief at 7. Defendant relies on these 
assertions to support his argument that defendant formed 
expectations in reasonable reliance on the State's plea offer. 
Id. 
Although the factual representations are technically 
correct, the "reasonableness" of defendant's reliance and 
expectations necessitates endorsing his version of the 
negotiations, which the trial court declined to do. The 
prosecutor proffered that he made a plea offer, which defendant 
rejected. Defendant cannot "reasonably" form an expectation in a 
plea offer that he has rejected. 
In any event, the State's argument establishes that 
defendant's expectations, reasonable or otherwise, lack any legal 
significance. 
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held that a plea agreement "standing alone is without 
constitutional significance; in itself it is a mere executory 
agreement which, until embodied in the judgment of a court, does 
not deprive an accused of liberty or any other constitutionally 
protected interest.'' Id. at 507-508. A plea entered pursuant to 
a plea bargain is susceptible to constitutional challenge only if 
a breach calls into question whether the defendant entered the 
plea with full knowledge of its consequences. Id. at 508-11. 
Defendant had even less than that which the United States 
Supreme Court found without "constitutional significance" in 
Mabry. Defendant has not challenged the trial court's finding 
that no plea agreement existed; he only claims a constitutional 
right to enforce a plea offer. If he had no constitutional right 
to enforce a plea agreement that did not result in a plea, he 
certainly had no right to enforce an offer that did not result in 
a plea agreement. 
Defendant does not cite Mabry. Instead, he relies heavily 
on Cooper v. United States, 594 F.2d 12 (4th cir. 1979), 
abrogated by Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504 (1984) to support his 
claim that he had a constitutional right to enforce the plea 
offer. In Cooper, the Fourth Circuit recognized a constitutional 
right to enforce a plea offer under certain circumstances 
embodied in "the right to fundamental fairness embraced within 
substantive due process guarantees," and "less directly" in the 
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Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. 
Id. at 18. However, as already established, the United States 
Supreme Court found that no such constitutional right existed. 
Consequently, Cooper is no longer good law to support the 
proposition for which defendant cites it. See also Plaster v. 
United States, 789 F.2d 289, 292 (4th Cir. 1986) (recognizing 
that Mabry overruled Cooper, but distinguishing Mabry from the 
facts in Plaster). 
Defendant also suggests that State v. Bero, 645 P.2d 44 
(Utah 1982) recognizes the constitutional right he asked the 
trial court to enforce. Appellant's Brief at 6-7. However, Bero 
stands for the opposite proposition: "a 'plea agreement' that was 
never agreed upon need not be fulfilled." Id. at 46. 
Bero agreed to plead guilty to possession with intent to 
distribute. The written plea agreement indicated that the State 
would move to dismiss two other charges in exchange for the plea. 
At the plea hearing, defense counsel represented that she 
understood the agreement to include a promise not to forfeit 
Bero's car. The prosecutor represented that they had discussed 
such a term during negotiations, but that it never became part of 
the agreement. Id. 
The trial court in Bero found that the parties had reached 
no meeting of the minds concerning the car. Nevertheless, the 
trial court concluded that "equity and fairness" required the 
9 
State to return the car. Id. 
The supreme court unanimously reversed. The supreme court 
held that "both parties to a plea agreement should know that they 
must approach the court having reached a firm proposed agreement 
which does not become enforceable until approved by the court." 
Id. at 47 (emphasis added). 
In this case, defendant asked the trial court to do what the 
supreme court reversed another trial court for doing: enforce a 
plea offer that never became part of a plea agreement approved by 
the court. The trial court correctly declined defendant's 
invitation. 
Alternatively, the trial court correctly denied the motion 
because defendant did not file it timely.5 That ruling provides 
an independent basis for affirming the trial court's denial of 
the motion. 
On appeal, defendant challenges this ruling in a one-
sentence, footnote argument equating the motion to a motion 
challenging the trial court's jurisdiction that may be filed at 
any time. Appellant's Brief at 4 n.4, citing Utah R. Crim. P. 
12(b)(1). Defendant argues only that, if the court had granted 
the motion, it would have lost jurisdiction over the case. 
defendant misstates that the trial court "opined that 
Defendant's motion may not have been timely." Appellant's Brief 
at 4 (emphasis added). To the contrary, the trial court ruled, 
"I agree with [the prosecutor] that the motion is not timely" (R. 
321 at 25). 
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Defendant offers no analysis or support for this argument 
that a motion to enforce a plea offer equates to a challenge to 
the trial court's jurisdiction. The Court may reject this 
argument as inadequately briefed and affirm the trial court's 
conclusion that defendant untimely filed his motion to enforce 
the agreement. Utah R. App. P. 24 (a)(9) (requiring appellant to 
support his argument with citation to authorities). 
In any event, the argument is meritless. Appellant relies 
on Utah R. Crim. P. 12(b)(1). However, that rule only excludes 
from the time limit in 12(b) jurisdictional defects in an 
indictment or information. Defendant claimed no jurisdictional 
defect in the information. 
Indeed, defendant raised no jurisdictional claim at all. To 
the contrary, defendant asked the trial court to exercise its 
jurisdiction to enforce an alleged plea agreement. Defendant's 
attempt to characterize the motion as a challenge to the trial 
court's jurisdiction directly contradicts the relief he sought. 
11 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court correctly rejected defendant's claim that he 
had a constitutional right to enforce a plea offer. 
Alternatively, the trial court correctly denied relief on the 
independent alternative grounds that defendant did not file the 
motion timely. The Court should affirm defendant's conviction on 
either or both grounds. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
^^J^p-^^-^ji 
THOMAS BRUNKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
91 CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES 58-37-8 
58-37-8. Prohibited acts — Penalties. 
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to 
knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to 
produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit sub-
stance; 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, 
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit 
substance; 
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to 
distribute; or 
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where: 
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in conduct 
which results in any violation of any provision of Title 58, 
Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d that is a felony; and 
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or more 
violations of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on 
separate occasions that are undertaken in concert with five or 
more persons with respect to whom the person occupies a position 
of organizer, supervisor, or any other position of management. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (lXa) with respect to: 
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II or a controlled sub-
stance analog is guilty of a second degree felony and upon a second or 
subsequent conviction is guilty of a first degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is 
guilty of a third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent 
conviction is guilty of a second degree felony; or 
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of 
a third degree felony. 
(c) -Any person who has been convicted of a violation of Subsection 
(D(aXii) or (iii) may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate 
term as provided by law, but if the trier of fact finds a firearm as defined 
in Section 76-10-501 was used, carried, or possessed on his person or in his 
immediate possession during the commission or in furtherance of the 
offense, the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a 
term of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and the court 
may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term 
not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently. 
(d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (D(aXiv) is guilty of a 
first degree felony punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term 
of not less than seven years and which may be for life. Imposition or 
execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not 
eligible for probation. 
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a 
controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescrip-
tion or order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of 
his professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this chapter; 
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any 
building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place 
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knowingly and intentionally to permit them to be occupied by persons 
unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in 
any of those locations; or 
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an 
altered or forged prescription or written order for a controlled sub-
stance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to: 
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a 
second degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, marijuana, if the 
amount is more than 16 ounces, but less than 100 pounds, or a 
controlled substance analog, is guilty of a third degree felony; or 
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted 
resin from any part of the plant, and the amount is more than one 
ounce but less than 16 ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) while inside 
the exterior boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility as 
defined in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement 
shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than provided in 
Subsection (2Kb). 
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of possession of any 
controlled substance by a person, that person shall be sentenced to a one 
degree greater penalty than provided in this Subsection (2). 
(e) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to all other 
controlled substances not included in Subsection (2Xb)(i), (ii), or (iii), 
including less than one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor. Upon a second conviction the person is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction the person is 
guilty of a third degree felony. 
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(ii) or (2)(a)(iii) is: 
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor; 
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and 
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree 
felony. 
(3) Prohibited acts C — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a 
controlled substance a license number which is fictitious, revoked, 
suspended, or issued to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining 
a controlled substance, to assume the title of, or represent himself to 
be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, veteri-
narian, or other authorized person; 
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to 
procure the administration of, to obtain a prescription for, to prescribe 
or dispense to any person known to be attempting to acquire or obtain 
possession of, or to procure the administration of any controlled 
substance by misrepresentation or failure by the person to disclose his 
receiving any controlled substance from another source, fraud, forg-
ery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or written order 
for a controlled substance, or the use of a false name or address; 
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a 
controlled substance, or to utter the same, or to alter any prescription 
or written order issued or written under the terms of this chapter; or 
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(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or 
other thing designed to print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark, 
trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or 
any likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or 
labeling so as to render any drug a counterfeit controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3Xa) is guilty of a 
third degree felony. 
(4) Prohibited acts D — Penalties: 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not 
authorized under this chapter who commits any act declared to be 
unlawful under this section, Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Parapher-
nalia Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances 
Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and classifications under 
Subsection (4Kb) if the act is committed: 
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the 
grounds of any of those schools; 
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or postsecondary insti-
tution or on the grounds of any of those schools or institutions; 
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other 
structure or grounds which are, at the time of the act, being used for 
an activity sponsored by or through a school or institution under 
Subsections (4)(a)(i) and (ii); 
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility; 
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center; 
(vi) in a church or synagogue; 
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater, 
movie house, playhouse, or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto; 
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure; 
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included 
in Subsections (4Xa)(i) through (viii); or 
(x) in the immediate presence of a person younger than 18 years of 
age, regardless of where the act occurs. 
(b) A person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of a first 
degree felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than five years 
if the penalty that would otherwise have been established but for this 
subsection would have been a first degree felony. Imposition or execution 
of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for 
probation. 
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established 
would have been less than a first degree felony but for this Subsection (4), 
a person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of one degree more 
than the maximum penalty prescribed for that offense. 
(d) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this Subsection (4) that the 
actor mistakenly believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at 
the time of the offense or was unaware of the individual's true age; nor 
that the actor mistakenly believed that the location where the act occurred 
was not as described in Subsection (4)(a) or was unaware that the location 
where the act occurred was as described in Subsection (4)(a). 
(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class 
B misdemeanor. 
(6) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, and 
not in lieu of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by 
law. 
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(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law
 0f 
another state, conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law
 0f 
another state for the same act is a bar to prosecution in this state. 
(7) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof which 
shows a person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or 
dispensed a controlled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence that 
the person or persons did so with knowledge of the character of the substance 
or substances. 
(8) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the 
course of his professional practice only and not for humans, from prescribing, 
dispensing, or administering controlled substances or from causing the sub-
stances to be administered by an assistant or orderly under his direction and 
supervision. 
(9) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on: 
(a) any person registered under the Controlled Substances Act who 
manufactures, distributes, or possesses an imitation controlled substance 
for use as a placebo or investigational new drug by a registered practitio-
ner in the ordinary course of professional practice or research; or 
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate 
scope of his employment. 
(10) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to 
any person or circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter 
shall be given effect without the invalid provision or application. 
History: L. 1971, ch. 145, S 8; 1972, ch. 22, 
§ 1; 1977, ch. 29, § 8; 1979, ch. 12, * 5; 1985, 
ch. 148, § 1; 1988, ch. 198, § 1; 1987, ch. 92, 
§ 100; 1987, ch. 190, § 3; 1988, ch. 95, 3 1; 
1989, ch. 50, § 2; 1988, ch. 58, * 1; 1989, ch. 
178, § 1; 1989, ch. 187, S 2; 1989, ch. 201, § 1; 
1990, ch. 181, § 1; 1990, ch. 183, S 2; 1990, 
ch. 183, § 3; 1991, ch. 80, § 1; 1991, ch. 198, 
§ 4; 1991, ch. 288, § 7; 1995, ch. 284, § 1; 
1998, ch. 1, § 8; 1997, ch. 84, § 8; 1998, ch. 
139, § 1; 1999, ch. 12, ft 1; 1999, ch. 303, § 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1998 amend-
ment, effective May 4, 1998, deleted former 
Subsection (6) which read: "Any person who 
attempts or conspires to commit any offense 
unlawful under this chapter is upon conviction 
guilty of one degree less than the maximum 
penalty prescribed for that offense," redesignat-
ing the other subsections accordingly. 
The 1999 amendment by ch. 12, effective May 
3,1999, substituted "in the immediate presence 
o r for "with" in Subsection (4XaXx) and made 
minor stylistic changes in Subsections (2) and 
(4). 
The 1999 amendment by ch. 303, effective 
May 3, 1999, added Subsection (lXc), redesig-
nating former Subsection (lXc) as (lXd), sub-
stituted "chapter" for "subsection" in Subsec-
tion (2XaXi), and made a minor stylistic 
change. 
This section is set out as reconciled by the 
Office of Legislative Research and General 
Counsel. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Charging offense. 
—Separate offenses. 
Physician-patient privilege. 
Possession. 
—Constructive. 
Sentencing. 
—Enhancement for prior conviction. 
Sufficiency of evidence. 
—Constructive possession. 
—Failure to marshal evidence. 
Cited. 
Charging offense. 
—Separate offenaea. 
Defendant's concurrent possession of mari-
juana paraphernalia and methamphetamine 
satisfied the temporal requirement of the single 
criminal episode statute but, because separate 
statutory offenses were involved, the posses-
sion did not satisfy the "same criminal objec-
tive" requirement. State v. Keppler, 1999 UT 
App 89, 976 P.2d 99. 
Physician-patient privilege. 
Section 58-37-6 creates an exception to the 
CLANDESTINE DRUG LAB ACT 58-37d-5 
'Subsection 58-37-2(19) of the Utah Controlled 
Substances Act" in Subsection (lXfXiii); and 
added Subsection (2). 
58-37d-4. Prohibited acts — Second degree felony. 
(1) It is unlawful for any person to knowingly or intentionally: 
(a) possess a controlled substance precursor with the intent to engage 
in a clandestine laboratory operation; 
(b) possess laboratory equipment or supplies with the intent to engage 
in a clandestine laboratory operation; 
(c) sell, distribute, or otherwise supply a precursor chemical, laboratory 
equipment, or laboratory supplies knowing or having reasonable cause to 
believe it will be used for a clandestine laboratory operation; 
(d) evade recordkeeping provisions of Title 58, Chapter 37c, Controlled 
Substances Precursor Act, or the regulations issued under that act, 
knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that the material distrib-
uted or received will be used for a clandestine laboratory operation; 
(e) conspire with or aid another to engage in a clandestine laboratory 
operation; 
(f) produce or manufacture, or possess with intent to produce or 
manufacture a controlled or counterfeit substance except as authorized 
under Title 58, Chapter 37, Utah Controlled Substances Act; or 
(g) transport or convey a controlled or counterfeit substance with the 
intent to distribute or to be distributed by the person transporting or 
conveying the controlled or counterfeit substance or by any other person 
regardless of whether the final destination for the distribution is within 
this state or any other location. 
(2) Aperson who violates any provision of Subsection (1) is guilty of a second 
degree felony. 
,B*»tory: C. IMS, 58*37d-4, enacted by L. (IXf) and (g) and made stylistic changes accord-
'HS, ch. 156, § 4; 1997,
 ch. 64,1 11. ingly. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend- Croat-Reference*. — Sentencing for felo-
*«*, effective May 5,1997, added Subsections nies, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-203, 76-3-301. 
^7d.5 . Prohibited acts — First degree felony. 
(1) Aperson who violates Subsection 58-37d-4(lXa), (b), (e), or (f) is guilty of 
a
 first degree felony if the trier of fact also finds any one of the following 
Editions occurred in conjunction with that violation: 
(a) possession of a firearm; 
(b) use of a booby trap; 
(c) illegal possession, transportation, or disposal of hazardous or dan-
gerous material or while transporting or causing to be transported 
materials in furtherance of a clandestine laboratory operation, there was 
coated a substantial risk to human health or safety or a danger to the 
ei
*vironment; 
(d) 
intended laboratory operation was to take place or did take place 
^thin 500 feet of a residence, place of business, church, or school; 
te) any phase of the clandestine laboratory operation or production or 
JJ^ufacture of a controlled or counterfeit substance involved a person less 
l
**n 18 years of age; 
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58-37d-5. Prohibited acts — First degree felony. 
(1) A person who violates Subsection 58-37d-4(l)(a), (b), (e), or (f) is guilty of 
a first degree felony if the trier of fact also finds any one of the following 
conditions occurred in conjunction with that violation: 
(a) possession of a firearm; 
(b) use of a booby trap; 
(c) illegal possession, transportation, or disposal of hazardous or dan-
gerous material or while transporting or causing to be transported 
materials in furtherance of a clandestine laboratory operation, there was 
created a substantial risk to human health or safety or a danger to the 
environment; 
(d) intended laboratory operation was to take place or did take place 
within 500 feet of a residence, place of business, church, or school; 
(e) clandestine laboratory operation actually produced any amount of a 
specified controlled substance; or 
(f) intended clandestine laboratory operation was for the production of 
cocaine base or methamphetamine base. 
(2) If the trier of fact finds that two or more of the conditions listed in 
Subsections (IXa) through (f) of this section occurred in conjunction with the 
violation, at sentencing for the first degree felony: 
(a) probation shall not be granted; 
(b) the execution or imposition of sentence shall not be suspended; and 
(c) the court shall not enter a judgment for a lower category of offense. 
History: C. IMS, 58-374-6, enacted by L. deleted former Subsection (lXe), which con-
1998, ch- 156, 9 5; 1997, ch. 64 ,1 12; 1998, cerned clandestine drug laboratory operations 
ch. 66, i 1; 2006, ch. 187,1 1. involving or conducted in the presence of per-
Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amend- sons under 18. A similar provision was enacted 
ment, effective May 4, 1998, inserted "or was as Section 76-5-112.5. 
conducted in the presence o r after "involved* in Cross-References. - Sentencing for felo-
Subsection (lXe). ^^ §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-203, 76-3-301. 
The 2000 amendment, effective May 1,2000, 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS controlled substance precursor as a lesser in-
. , . . - . eluded offense of operating a methamphet-
Lesser included offenses,
 a m i n # laboratory. State v. Hopkins, 1999 UT Sufficiency of evidence, gg, 939 p 2d 1065. 
included o f l w m . Sufficiency of evidence. 
Because no special verdict form was used, Where the defendant did not acknowledge, 
and because it was possible that the jury relied let alone marshal, the evidence presented at 
upon Subsection 5£-37d-4(lXa) in reaching its trial, but described only fragmented portions of 
verdict, which includes all the elements for the evidence, the Supreme Court declined to 
conviction of possession of a controlled sub- consider his contention that the evidence was 
stance precursor, the defendant was entitled to insufficient for conviction. State v. Hopkins, 
reversal of his conviction for possession of a 1999 UT 98, 989 P.2d 1065. 
ADDENDUM B 
MR. HOLM: Yes. Thank you, Your Honor. The 
basis for my motion is set forth in the affidavits. 
Those, I guess, constitute a proffer of our testimony 
in this case. If the court wishes, we can certainly 
both be sworn, Mr. Schmitt and myself, to testify 
regarding the circumstances surrounding the offer of 
the plea. In April of 1999, shortly after my filing a 
motion to suppress the evidence, I had discussions 
with Mr. Burns regarding a potential plea agreement 
for not only Mr. Schmitt, but Mr. Shell and 
Ms. LePoma, who I also represent and is not before the 
court today. 
That motion --or that plea agreement was to 
the effect that Mr. Schmitt would plead guilty to an 
amended information charging possession of a 
clandestine drug lab, a second degree felony, that 
being the charge without the enhancements that are 
included under the code. And that he would be 
entitled then to condition that plea upon his denial 
of the motion to suppress which had been filed, or if 
it was denied, and/or if it was denied, it's 
affirmance on appeal. 
I spoke with Mr. Schmitt. I recall 
specifically going to the jail, speaking with him and 
spending substantial amount of time, probably upwards 
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1 I of an hour in discussing that plea offer with 
2 Mr. Schmitt. He initially did not want to accept it. 
3 After extensive discussion, I got his agreement to 
4 accept the offer. I remember specifically calling on 
5 the telephone to Mr. Burns after that meeting on my 
6 cell phone and saying, I have just been raked over the 
7 coals by my client but he has agreed to the settlement 
8 offer, and suggested that he then prepare the 
9 appropriate documents, a written plea agreement, 
10 present to the court to do that. 
11 THE COURT: Mr. Holm, let me interrupt you 
12 briefly. 
13 Mr. Burns, are you going to require that 
14 Mr. Holm testify under oath so you can cross-examine 
15 him? 
16 MR. BURNS: I'll accept a proffer as long as 
17 it doesn't get too crazy. 
18 THE COURT: I am assuming that what you are 
19 doing now is proffering --
20 MR. HOLM: Basically, yes. 
21 THE COURT: All right. 
22 MR. HOLM: Some of it's already in this 
23 affidavit. But I have added some additional facts in 
24 this proffer. 
25 In any event, thereafter, there was some --
the macter, more or less, got dropped. We focused 
more on the motion to suppress. I do recall that in 
June the matter came up again with regard to 
Mr. Shell. And, in fact, a written plea agreement was 
prepared. We were still in the midst of litigating 
the motion to suppress. I remember sitting in court 
with both Mr. Shell and Mr. Schmitt here, and 
explaining to the court that we wish to at least take 
care of Mr. Shell's plea at that time. The court 
said, Well, while that motion is still pending, I am 
not going to -- I don't want to take a plea. I think 
it's premature. And but I did again confirm with 
Mr. Schmitt and Mr. Burns on -- on or about that date. 
I believe it was the 7th of June, that we were in 
court, that Mr. Schmitt still desired to go forward 
with the plea bargain that had been offered by the 
State of Utah. And then it again got lost in the 
shuffle, so to speak. 
I went and visited with my client on the 13th 
of August. And he advised me that he still very much 
wanted to accept the plea bargain that had been 
offered by the state. I then called Mr. Burns on the 
18th of August and was informed that he did not, no 
longer wish to go forward with that plea agreement. 
I believe that the state is compelled to go 
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on with, one, the plea agreement, based on the case 
law that I have cited in my memorandum; specifically, 
the civil cases that allow for enforcement of 
settlement agreements. 
THE COURT: I have read the memorandum. 
MR. HOLM: Okay. Contracts. And then, even 
if there is not a "contract," an offer plus 
acceptance, then the Cooper vs. United States case 
gives some authority. And also the Barrow case, at 
least by analogy, gives some authority for the 
proposition that even without an agreement if there is 
a reasonable expectation on the part of the defendant 
that the plea would be -- should be granted, even 
though you don't have the zap, as my contracts 
professor would call it, the actual contract; that 
still, under -- even under those circumstances, the 
plea agreement is enforceable. And we would, 
therefore, submit that the state has an obligation to 
follow through with the plea agreement that was 
offered with regard to Mr. Schmitt. 
THE COURT: Well, let me ask a couple of 
questions. Is it your position that there was an 
actual contract arrived at? 
MR. HOLM: It is my position that there was 
because, as I stated before, I spoke with Mr. Burns, 
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immediately after speaking with my client in April, 
and advised him that my client had accepted the offer. 
THE COURT: Has the existence, or at least 
your perception that there was an existence of an 
agreement, at all modified your approach to preparing 
for this case? 
MR. HOLM: Well, it has to a certain extent, 
Your Honor. And, in fact, that gets into our -- the 
consolidation issue. My position has been all along 
that Mr. Schmitt wouldn't be going to trial and, 
therefore, I could safely represent both defendants at 
a -- in this case, because Mr. Schmitt would never 
ultimately go to trial and, therefore, I could safely 
represent the interests of Mr. Shell at a trial while 
at the same time Mr. Schmitt would be accepting a plea 
bargain and there wouldn't be a conflict of interest 
in my representing both of them in further 
proceedings. 
THE COURT: That raises the next question: 
If you are required to go to trial representing both 
defendants, in your view, is there a conflict of 
interest? 
MR. HOLM: I believe there is, yeah. I 
believe there is a conflict of their factual positions 
in the case. The items were found in a master bedroom 
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and "master bathroom." Admittedly, that's the only 
bathroom in the trailer. But it is immediately off 
the master bedroom, which was occupied by Mr. Schmitt. 
So my argument with regard to Mr. Shell is that it was 
only constructive, at best, constructive possession, 
and that the state's required to show constructive 
possession because it's not in his immediate 
possession; whereas, Mr. Shell may have a desire to 
shift some of the blame to Mister -- or Mr. Schmitt 
may have a desire to shift some of the blame to 
Mr. Shell for items that were found in the bedroom and 
bathroom --
THE COURT: Okay. Anything else? 
MR. HOLM: With regard to the motion to 
enforce the plea agreement, no, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Just to summarize, how many times 
did you communicate to Mr. Burns that you had accepted 
his offer? 
MR. HOLM: I believe twice, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: And those were once on the cell 
phone? 
MR. HOLM: Once on the cell phone in April. 
And once when we were either -- either before or after 
or on the same date that we were in court on 
Mr. Shell's case. 
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THE COURT: Okay. That was in June? 
MR. HOLM: June. I believe it was the 7th. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Burns. 
MR. BURNS: Thank you, Your Honor. The first 
thing I would like to say just as a general premise, 
is that we are here today and this case has been 
pending since October of 1998. And it's the state's 
position that these defendants have been provided with 
every constitutional right and protection at every 
stage of these proceedings. And there is no prejudice 
for them to have a jury trial. That's first and 
foremost. Counsel almost makes it sound like it's the 
last thing you want to do is put on evidence and have 
a trial. That's one. 
Two. It upsets me greatly for counsel to 
stand up here today and say that he may have a 
potential conflict between Mr. Schmitt and Mr. Shell. 
And the reason that it upsets me is because, at the 
preliminary hearing stage, in front of Judge 
Braithwaite, and counsel will recall, not only did I 
ask the court to inquire of Mr. Holm, but ask that 
each defendant from their own mouth waive any conflict 
and state to the court that they wanted Mr. Holm to 
represent both of them. 
I haven't had a chance to check the minute 
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entries or the tape in this court, but it's my 
recollection that Your Honor did the same thing, that 
both of these defendants waived any claim or conflict 
of Mr. Holm. And it upsets me that at 4:50 p.m. on 
the Friday before the jury trial on Monday, Mr. Holm 
files a motion stating there may be some conflict. I 
would say two things: One, it is not timely. I don't 
think the court should even consider a motion filed at 
11:59 before 12 o'clock trial, Friday at 4:50. Almost 
sounds like intentional sabotage. I wasn't even in 
the office. I haven't even seen the motions until 
this morning, which is the morning of trial. 
Two. It almost sounds like intentional error 
or bad faith to go almost a year representing both of 
these defendants and then at 4:50 p.m. on Friday 
before a Monday trial file a motion to say I think I 
have a conflict, I think they have defenses which are 
conflicting. The state's position is there are no 
conflicting defenses. The court's heard the evidence 
through numerous suppression hearings and the state's 
evidence, basically, is, we got information there was 
a meth lab. Officers went there. We went to a 
trailer. Both of these defendants came out of the 
trailer, and there was a meth lab and methamphetamine 
in the trailer. 
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I guess they can both point the finger at 
each other, but Mr. Holm chose not to do that at this 
point. So I believe that that is not timely and not 
made in good faith. 
With respect to the motion to enforce the 
plea agreement, the state offered this defendant, 
Mr. Schmitt, and this defendant, Mr. Shell, a plea 
agreement. Counsel can't be right saying that in 
April he met with Mr. Schmitt and then called me and 
told me to prepare the documents, because I have in 
the file, in Mr. Schmitt's file, a plea agreement that 
I signed dated March of 1999. So he couldn't have 
done that. That's one. 
Two. My position is, I ordered it to these 
defendants. And their position was they wanted to see 
how the suppression hearing went before they agreed to 
any plea bargain or not. And after the plea bargain, 
Mr. Holms called me again -- after the suppression 
hearing, when the court ruled that the evidence ought 
not be suppressed, Mr. Holm called me again and I 
said, I am sick of it. We have had motion after 
motion. This case has been pending almost a year. 
There are no offers on the table, I am not prepared at 
this time to go forward with the offer. Your clients 
didn't sign it, didn't accept it, and there are no 
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more offers. 
So my position is, I made an offer to 
Mr. Holm. His clients didn't accept it. And now on, 
again, on the eve of trial, here we are the day of 
trial, now they want to enforce the plea agreement. 
And my position is it's not timely. 
With respect to the final motion, our motion 
to consolidate --
THE COURT: We are only talking about the 
motion to enforce the plea agreement. Let me ask you 
a couple of quick questions. So I take it from what 
you just said, that that would be your testimony if 
you were called to testify. 
MR. BURNS: Yes. If I were called to 
testify, I made the offer, counsel didn't respond to 
me after the suppression hearing. He said he wanted 
it, and I said, Too late. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Holm, are you 
willing to accept that proffer of evidence? 
MR. HOLM: I am willing to accept -- I am 
willing to accept and stipulate that there were some 
discussions in March of 1999. And I don't dispute 
that a plea agreement was prepared. I have never seen 
it. But I don't dispute that. 
THE COURT: Well, the question is whether you 
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accept 
be? 
Mr. Burns' proffer of what his 
MR. HOLM: 
THE COURT: 
Yes. 
All 
testimony would 
right, Do either 
to cross-examine the other on your proffer? 
clear, 
cross-
i'M'JV, B U R N S : 
THE COURT: 
MR, H GIN.: 
No, 
Mr. 
Yes. 
Your Honor. 
Holm? 
I guess to 
I better -- I hate to do that, 
examine. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. 
come up and take the oath, please. 
ca 
SCOTT BURNS, 
J 3 eel by P] an rti ff, having been 
sworn, was examined and testifies 
\BY MR. 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
HOLM: 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
Mr Bur ns, state 
Scott Burns 
A n d where di 
Cedar City. 
You are t. line 
) "/UU 
your name. 
I I 76? 
d!" 1,or nf;""y for t he 
of Utah in this case? 
A 
Q 
Yes 
Are you - - you state that you 
• 
of you wish 
make the record 
but I 
Burns, 
duly 
better 
will you 
as follows: 
p 1 a int. 
made 
iff, State 
a proposal 
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for a plea agreement in March of 1999; is that 
correct? 
A Yes. 
Q You have a copy of that plea agreement? 
A I do. Are you talking about Mr. Schmitt? 
0 For Mr. Schmitt, yes. 
THE CLERK: State's? 
MR. HOLM: Yes. No. Let's make that a 
defense exhibit. 
THE COURT: This will be a separate set of 
exhibits from the trial exhibits. 
BY MR. HOLM: 
Q Showing you Exhibits D-l and D-2, did you have 
your office prepare those documents? 
A I did. 
Q They appear to be originals. Were they ever 
delivered to counsel, do you know? 
A No, they were not. 
0 Do you deny having a telephone conference with 
me where I disclosed to you that I had spoken with my 
client, and after some difficulty had got his 
agreement to a plea agreement? 
A I deny that. In fact, my recollection is your 
client did not want to accept my offer. And based 
upon that, I didn't forward to you copies. I didn't 
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forward to you the originals for signing. 
in my file. 
Honor. 
amended 
MR. 
THE 
m^ 
THE 
MR. 
HOLM: 
COURT: 
HOLM: 
COURT: 
HOLM : 
information 
THE 
MR, 
THE 
this motion, 
the sub: 
COURT: 
BURNS: 
COURT: 
I kept them \ 
i 
Okay. No further questions, Your 1 
Okay. 
Offer Exhibi t:s 1 ai i< I 2. 
Those are what? 
Proposed plea agreement: 
Any objection? 
No, Your Honor. 
I'll receive them for j 
Yoi 1 may step down, Mr Bairns 
(Defendant s Exhibit Nos. 1 and 2 
were received into evidence.) 
THE COURT: 
lect of th'i s 
agreement? 
client, 
Honor, : 
MR, HOLM: 
Mr. Schmitt 
MR BURNS: 
^ i
 right. Any other < 
and ai i 
purposes of 
evidence on 
motion to enforce the plea 
Yes. 1 should probably 
I'] 1 accept a proffer, 
in the interest of time. 
THE 
MR. 
COURT: 
HOLM: 
the affidavit, Your 
I assume this proffer 
Proffer would be in the 
Honor. 
call my 
Your 
--
nature of 
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THE COURT: All right. I'll accept that 
proffer, Mr. Burns, having consented to that. 
MR. BURNS: No objection. 
THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Holm? 
MR. HOLM: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Burns, anything more? 
MR. BURNS: No, sir. 
THE COURT: Do either wish to argue it? 
MR. HOLM: Well, yes, I do wish to add some 
additional comment with regard to Mr. Burns' argument. 
With regard to timeliness, if you look at Rule 12, 
Rule 12(b)(1) states, defenses and objections based 
on -- ordinarily you are required to file a motion 
within five days prior to trial. But there is an 
exception with regard to defenses and objections based 
on defects in the indictment and information. Other 
than that, it fails to show jurisdiction in the court 
or charge an offense. Okay. Well, I would -- the 
argument here is that this court doesn't have 
jurisdiction over Mr. Schmitt on a first degree felony 
and a second degree felony because of the plea 
agreement. And so, therefore, the timeliness of it is 
not an issue. It's -- I guess it would be similar to 
a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction which can be brought at any time before 
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the court. 
With regard to the issue of separate trials, 
I want to read to you from the transcript of the 
preliminary hearing, Your Honor. And thar - page 50. 
THE COURT: We haven't really got to the 
issue of separate trials yet, Mr. Holm. Al though it's 
been mentioned, I have been considering the evidence 
presented --or the comments presented here as related 
to the motion to enforce. 
MR. HOLM: All right. I will cover that 
issue then when we get to that motion, if we do. 
THE COURT: Anything el se? 
MR. HOLM: Nothing further Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Burns. 
MR BURNS: Just briefly, Your Honor. I 
would argue to the court, after 13 years of doi ng 
this, my practice is tha*" there is a plea agreement, 
if there is a meeting ui uiie minds, i f thei e i s a 
contract, i t sure happens before the day of trial 
p ^ ^ itia clear that the state did not believe that any 
plea agreement had been effected by and between any of 
these parties because we have been preparing for trial 
for the last week And we are here and prepared to go 
forward to trial, which would be consistent with what 
actually occurred, and til **- i * *-bey didn't want a 
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plea agreement. They wanted to have a suppression 
hearing. And here we are on the date of trial. The 
only support at all that there was a plea agreement 
that was enforceable was a motion filed at 4:50 p.m. 
on Friday. We'll submit it. 
THE COURT: A thought just occurred to me, do 
you have any transcript from June 7th or any clerk's 
minutes to support your contention that you offered to 
plead to Mr. Shell guilty at that time, the court 
wouldn't take the plea? 
MR. HOLM: I don't have a transcript of the 
proceedings on June 7th, no, Your Honor. Yeah, maybe 
there is something in the minutes, I don't know. 
Haven't looked at those, either. 
THE COURT: You said that happened on 
June 7th? 
MR. HOLM: I believe that's the date. I may 
be inaccurate. 
THE COURT: Was it the day of the suppression 
hearing? 
MR. HOLM: Well, we had several continued 
dates. One of them, I believe, was the 7th. One was 
the 14th. It may have been in May. I'm not -- I 
could be -- my clients believe it was in June. 
THE COURT: Well, I just looked at the 
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